CATHAY INSURANCE CO., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 76145 June 30, 1987 CATHAY INSURANCE CO., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

A complaint was filed by private respondent corporation against petitioner (then defendant) company seeking collection of the sum of P868,339.15 representing private respondent's losses and damages incurred in a shipment of seamless steel pipes under an insurance contract in favor of the said private respondent as the insured, consignee or importer of aforesaid merchandise while in transit from Japan to the Philippines on board vessel SS "Eastern Mariner." The total value of the shipment was P2,894,463.83 at the prevailing rate of P7.95 to a dollar in June and July 1984, when the shipment was made. The trial court decided in favor of private respondent corporation by ordering petitioner to pay it the sum of P866,339.15 as its recoverable insured loss equivalent to 30% of the value of the seamless steel pipes; ordering petitioner to pay private respondent interest on the aforecited amount at the rate of 34% or double the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board per annum from February 3, 1982 or 90 days from private respondent's submission of proof of loss to petitioner until paid as provided in the settlement of claim provision of the policy; and ordering petitioner to pay private respondent certain amounts for marine surveyor's fee, attorney's fees and costs of the suit.

 

ISSUE: WON the rusting of steel pipes in the course of a voyage is a "peril of the sea" in view of the toll on the cargo of wind, water, and salt conditions.

 

RULING:

 

There is no question that the rusting of steel pipes in the course of a voyage is a "peril of the sea" in view of the toll on the cargo of wind, water, and salt conditions. At any rate if the insurer cannot be held accountable therefor, We would fail to observe a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts, namely, that any ambiguity therein should be construed against the maker/issuer/drafter thereof, namely, the insurer. Besides the precise purpose of insuring cargo during a voyage would be rendered fruitless. Be it noted that any attack of the 15-day clause in the policy was foreclosed right in the pre-trial conference.

ANDREW PALERMO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PYRAMID INSURANCE CO., INC., defendant- appellant.

G.R. No. L-36480 May 31, 1988 ANDREW PALERMO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PYRAMID INSURANCE CO., INC., defendant- appellant.

FACTS:

On March 7, 1969, the insured, appellee Andrew Palermo, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against Pyramid Insurance Co., Inc., for payment of his claim under a Private Car Comprehensive Policy MV-1251 issued by the defendant (Exh. A). In its answer, the appellant Pyramid Insurance Co., Inc., alleged that it disallowed the claim because at the time of the accident, the insured was driving his car with an expired driver's license. After the trial, the court a quo rendered judgment on October 29, 1969 ordering the defendant "to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00, value of the insurance of the motor vehicle in question and to pay the costs." On November 26, 1969, the plaintiff filed a "Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal." It was opposed by the defendant, but was granted by the trial court on December 15, 1969.

 

ISSUE: WON plaintiff was not authorized to drive the insured motor vehicle because his driver's license had expired.

 

RULING:

 

There is no merit in the appellant's allegation that the plaintiff was not authorized to drive the insured motor vehicle because his driver's license had expired. The driver of the insured motor vehicle at the time of the accident was, the insured himself, hence an "authorized driver" under the policy. While the Motor Vehicle Law prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle on the highway without a license or with an expired license, an infraction of the Motor Vehicle Law on the part of the insured, is not a bar to recovery under the insurance contract. It however renders him subject to the penal sanctions of the Motor Vehicle Law. The requirement that the driver be "permitted in accordance with the licensing or other laws or regulations to drive the Motor Vehicle and is not disqualified from driving such motor vehicle by order of a Court of Law or by reason of any enactment or regulation in that behalf," applies only when the driver" is driving on the insured's order or with his permission." It does not apply when the person driving is the insured himself.

AMADOR CORPUZ and ROMEO GONZALES vs. EDISON LUGUE and CATHERINE BALUYOT,

AMADOR CORPUZ and ROMEO GONZALES vs. EDISON LUGUE and CATHERINE BALUYOT, G.R. No. 137772, July 29, 2005

FACTS:

On 14 September 1984, at around 7:15 in the morning, while an Isuzu KC-20 passenger jeep (KC-20), then being driven by Jimmy Basilio, was traversing the right side of the Roman Highway in Barangay Pias, Orion, Bataan, it collided with a tanker truck driven by Gerardo Lim, which was then moving from the right shoulder of the highway. As a consequence of the accident, passengers of the KC-20, including respondent Lugue, suffered physical injuries. Respondent Lugue then filed an action for damages arising from the vehicular incident before the Balanga, Bataan RTC, Branch 2, against herein petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales, owner and driver of the minibus, respectively, and Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, owner and driver of the tanker truck, respectively. Therein defendants filed a third-party complaint against Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio, owner/operator and driver of the KC-20, respectively.

 

ISSUE: whether or not the appellate court erred in holding them liable for damages based on the findings of facts adduced by the trial court.

 

RULING:

 

It is clear that the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Lugue was the collision between the KC-20 and the tanker truck. As correctly pointed out by the lower court, proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. This conclusion of the appellate court of recklessness on the part of petitioner Gonzales is, however, unwarranted. Based on the unchallenged testimony of petitioner Gonzales, he signaled to overtake the KC-20 because the way was clear. That despite his best effort to do everything to avoid hitting the KC-20, petitioner failed to do so because the KC-20 had moved to a position blocking the way of the minibus as a result of the tanker bumping the KC-20. Furthermore, based on the unrebutted testimony of both Remigio Gervacio and Patrocinio Carillo, at the time when the minibus hit the KC-20, the former was already moving towards the middle portion of the highway, occupying the left portion of the road, a little beyond the center line. Certainly, even assuming that petitioner Gonzales had a few seconds before actual collision, he no longer had any opportunity to avoid it. Petitioner Gonzales cannot be deemed negligent for failing to prevent the collision even after applying all means available to him within the few instants when he had discovered the impending peril.

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS 213 SCRA 493, September 2, 1992 NOCON, J.:

 

 

FACTS:

On October 22, 1986, deceased, Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation with his parents, spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa, and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries. While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie Surposa, died on October 18, 1988 as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the three (3) unidentified men. Private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said insurance policy filed a written notice of claim with the petitioner insurance company which denied said claim contending that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. Private respondent filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission which rendered a favorable response for the respondent. The appellate court ruled likewise. Petitioner filed this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in applying the principle of "expresso unius exclusio alterius" in a personal accident insurance policy, since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance policy considering that the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act of the assailant. Therefore, said death was committed with deliberate intent which, by the very nature of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the insurer is liable for the payment of the insurance premiums

 

HELD:

 

Yes, the insurer is still liable. Contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary. The terms "accident" and "accidental" as used in insurance contracts have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of the policies insuring against death or injury from accident. In the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that Carlie Surposa died in the course of an assault or murder as a result of his voluntary act considering the very nature of these crimes. Neither can it be said that where was a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his life to danger considering that he was just going home after attending a festival. Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy involved herein specifically enumerated only ten (10) circumstances wherein no liability attaches to petitioner insurance company for any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured as a result of any of the stimulated causes. The principle of " expresso unius exclusio alterius" — the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing — is therefore applicable in the instant case since murder and assault, not having been expressly included in the enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company from liability for, any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner insurance company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.

IVOR ROBERT DAYTON GIBSON, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO A. REVILLA

IVOR ROBERT DAYTON GIBSON, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO A. REVILLA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, and LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, respondents. G.R. No. L-41432 July 30, 1979

 

FACTS:

 

 Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed a complaint against Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. The civil suit thus instituted by Lepanto against Malayan was founded on the fact that Malayan issued a Marine Open Policy covering all shipments of copper, gold, and silver concentrates in bulk from Poro, San Fernando, La Union to Tacoma, Washington or to other places in the United States. Thereafter, Malayan obtained reinsurance abroad through Sedgwick, Collins & Co., Limited, a London insurance brokerage. The Memorandum of Insurance issued by Sedgwick to Malayan listed three groups of underwriters or reinsurers – Lloyds 62.808%, Companies (I.L.U.) 34.705%, Other companies 2.487%. At the top of the list of underwriting members of Lloyds is Syndicate No. 448, assuming 2.48% of the risk assumed by the reinsurer, which syndicate number petitioner Ivor Robert Dayton Gibson claims to be himself. Petitioner then filed a motion to intervene as defendant, which motion was denied by the lower court.

 

ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED, REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING THE INTERVENTION OF THE PETITIONER IN THE SUIT BETWEEN LEPANTO AND MALAYAN COMPANIES.

 

HELD:

 

No. The respondent Judge committed no error of law in denying petitioner’s Motion to Intervene and neither has he abused his discretion in his denial of petitioner’s Motion for Intervention. We agree with the holding of the respondent court that since movant Ivor Robert Dayton Gibson appears to be only one of several re-insurers of the risks and liabilities assumed by Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., it is highly probable that other re-insurers may likewise intervene. If petitioner is allowed to intervene, We hold that there is good and sufficient basis for the Court a quo to declare that the trial between Lepanto and Malayan would be definitely disrupted and would certainly unduly delay the proceedings between the parties especially at the stage where Lepanto had already rested its case and that the issue would also be compounded as more parties and more matters will have to be litigated. In other words, the Court’s discretion is justified and reasonable. We also hold that respondent Judge committed no reversible error in further sustaining the fourth ground of Lepanto’s Opposition to the Motion to Intervene that the rights, if any, of petitioner are not prejudiced by the present suit and will be fully protected in a separate action against him and his co-insurers by Malayan. Petitioner’s contention that he has to pay once Malayan is finally adjudged to pay Lepanto because of the very nature of a contract of reinsurance and considering that the re-insurer is obliged to pay as may be paid thereon (referring to the original policies), although this is subject to other stipulations and conditions of the reinsurance contract, is without merit. The general rule in the law of reinsurance is that the re-insurer is entitled to avail itself of every defense which the re-insured (which is Malayan) might urge in an action by the person originally insured (which is Lepanto). As to the effect of the clause “to pay as may be paid thereon” contained in petitioner’s re-insurance contract, Arnould, on the Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 13th Ed., Vol. 1, Section 327, p. 315, states the rule, this: “It has been decided that this clause does not preclude the reinsurer from insisting upon proper proof that a loss strictly within the terms of the original policy has taken place. “This clause does not enable the original underwriter to recover from his reinsurer to an extent beyond the subscription of the latter. “Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.” Pacific Timber Export Corporation vs Court of Appeals In 1963, Pacific Timber Export Corporation (PTEC) applied for a temporary marine insurance from Workmen’s Insurance Company (WIC) in order for the latter to insure 1,250,000 board feet of logs to be exported to Japan. In March 1963, WIC issued a cover note to PTEC for the said logs. On April 2, 1963, WIC issued two policies for the logs. However, the total board feet covered this time is only 1,195,498. On April 4, 1963, while the logs were in transit to Japan, bad weather prevailed and this caused the loss of 32 pieces of logs. WIC then asked an adjuster to investigate the loss. The adjuster submitted that the logs lost were not covered by the two policies issued on April 2, 1963 but said logs were included in the cover note earlier issued. WIC however denied the insurance claim of PTEC as it averred that the cover note became null and void when the two policies were subsequently issued. The Court of Appeals ruled that the cover note is void for lack of valuable consideration as it appeared that no premium payment therefor was made by PTEC. ISSUE: Whether or not a separate premium is needed for cover notes. HELD: No. The Cover Note was not without consideration for which the Court of Appeals held the Cover Note as null and void, and denied recovery therefrom. The fact that no separate premium was paid on the Cover Note before the loss insured against occurred, does not militate against the validity of PTEC’s contention, for no such premium could have been paid, since by the nature of the Cover Note, it did not contain, as all Cover Notes do not contain particulars of the shipment that would serve as basis for the computation of the premiums. As a logical consequence, no separate premiums are intended or required to be paid on a Cover Note. At any rate, it is not disputed that PTEC paid in full all the premiums as called for by the statement issued by WIC after the issuance of the two regular marine insurance policies, thereby leaving no account unpaid by PTEC due on the insurance coverage, which must be deemed to include the Cover Note. If the Note is to be treated as a separate policy instead of integrating it to the regular policies subsequently issued, the purpose and function of the Cover Note would be set at naught or rendered meaningless, for it is in a real sense a contract, not a mere application for insurance which is a mere offer.

Geagonia v CA G.R. No. 114427

Geagonia v CA G.R. No. 114427 February 6, 1995

 

Facts:

 

Geagonia, owner of a store, obtained from Country Bankers fire insurance policy for P100,000.00. The 1 year policy and covered thestock trading of dry goods. The policy noted the requirement that "3. The insured shall give notice to the Company of any insurance or insurances already effected, or which may subsequently be effected, covering any of the property or properties consisting of stocks in trade, goods in process and/or inventories only hereby insured, and unless notice be given and the particulars of such insurance or insurances be stated therein or endorsed in this policy pursuant to Section 50 of the Insurance Code, by or on behalf of the Company before the occurrence of any loss or damage, all benefits under this policy shall be deemed forfeited, provided however, that this condition shall not apply when the total insurance or insurances in force at the time of the loss or damage is not more than P200,000.00." The petitioners’ stocks were destroyed by fire. He then filed a claim which was subsequently denied because the petitioner’s stocks were covered by two other fire insurance policies for Php 200,000 issued by PFIC. The basis of the private respondent's denial was the petitioner's alleged violation of Condition 3 of the policy. Geagonia then filed a complaint against the private respondent in the Insurance Commission for the recovery of P100,000.00 under fire insurance policy and damages. He claimed that he knew the existence of the other two policies. But, he said that he had no knowledge of the provision in the private respondent's policy requiring him to inform it of the prior policies and this requirement was not mentioned to him by the private respondent's agent. The Insurance Commission found that the petitioner did not violate Condition 3 as he had no knowledge of the existence of the two fire insurance policies obtained from the PFIC; that it was Cebu Tesing Textiles w/c procured the PFIC policies w/o informing him or securing his consent; and that Cebu Tesing Textile, as his creditor, had insurable interest on the stocks. The Insurance Commission then ordered the respondent company to pay complainant the sum of P100,000.00 with interest and attorney’s fees. CA reversed the decision of the Insurance Commission because it found that the petitioner knew of the existence of the two other policies issued by the PFIC.

 

Issues:

1. WON the petitioner had not disclosed the two insurance policies when he obtained the fire insurance and thereby violated Condition 3 of the policy.

2. WON he is prohibited from recovering

 

Held: Yes. No. Petition Granted

 

Ratio:

 

1. The court agreed with the CA that the petitioner knew of the prior policies issued by the PFIC. His letter of 18 January 1991 to the private respondent conclusively proves this knowledge. His testimony to the contrary before the Insurance Commissioner and which the latter relied upon cannot prevail over a written admission made ante litem motam. It was, indeed, incredible that he did not know about the prior policies since these policies were not new or original.

 

2. Stated differently, provisions, conditions or exceptions in policies which tend to work a forfeiture of insurance policies should be construed most strictly against those for whose benefits they are inserted, and most favorably toward those against whom they are intended to operate. With these principles in mind, Condition 3 of the subject policy is not totally free from ambiguity and must be meticulously analyzed. Such analysis leads us to conclude that (a) the prohibition applies only to double insurance, and (b) the nullity of the policy shall only be to the extent exceeding P200,000.00 of the total policies obtained. Furthermore, by stating within Condition 3 itself that such condition shall not apply if the total insurance in force at the time of loss does not exceed P200,000.00, the private respondent was amenable to assume a co-insurer's liability up to a loss not exceeding P200,000.00. What it had in mind was to discourage over-insurance. Indeed, the rationale behind the incorporation of "other insurance" clause in fire policies is to prevent over-insurance and thus avert the perpetration of fraud. When a property owner obtains insurance policies from two or more insurers in a total amount that exceeds the property's value, the insured may have an inducement to destroy the property for the purpose of collecting the insurance. The public as well as the insurer is interested in preventing a situation in which a fire would be profitable to the insured.

JAMES STOKES vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC

JAMES STOKES vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. G.R. No. L-34768, 24 February 1984 127 SCRA 766

FACTS:

Daniel Adolfson had a subsisting Malayan car insurance policy with coverage against own damage as well as 3rd party liability when his car figured in a vehicular accident with another car, resulting to damage to both vehicles. At the time of the accident, Adolfson’s car was being driven by James Stokes, who was authorized to do so by Adolfson. Stokes, an Irish tourist who had been in the Philippines for only 90 days, had a valid and subsisting Irish driver’s license but without a Philippine driver’s license. Adolfson filed a claim with Malayan but the latter refused to pay contending that Stokes was not an authorized driver under the “Authorized Driver” clause of the insurance policy in relation to Section 21 of the Land Transportation Office.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not Malayan is liable to pay the insurance claim of Adolfson

 

HELD:

 

NO. A contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity upon the terms and conditions specified therein. When the insurer is called upon to pay in case of loss or damage, he has the right to insist upon compliance with the terms of the contract. If the insured cannot bring himself within the terms and conditions of the contract, he is not entitled as a rule to recover for the loss or damage suffered. For the terms of the contract constitute the measure of the insurer’s liability, and compliance therewith is a condition precedent to the right of recovery. At the time of the accident, Stokes had been in the Philippines for more than 90 days. Hence, under the law, he could not drive a motor vehicle without a Philippine driver’s license. He was therefore not an “authorized driver” under the terms of the insurance policy in question, and Malayan was right in denying the claim of the insured. Acceptance of premium within the stipulated period for payment thereof, including the agreed period of grace, merely assures continued effectivity of the insurance policy in accordance with its terms. Such acceptance does not estop the insurer from interposing any valid defense under the terms of the insurance policy. The principle of estoppel is an equitable principle rooted upon natural justice which prevents a person from going back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of another whom he has led to rely upon them. The principle does not apply to the instant case. In accepting the premium payment of the insured, Malayan was not guilty of any inequitable act or representation. There is nothing inconsistent between acceptance of premium due under an insurance policy and the enforcement of its terms. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed. The complaint is dismissed. Costs against appellees.

EMILIO TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

EMILIO TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 48049, 29 June 1989

FACTS: Tan Lee Siong, father of herein petitioners, applied for life insurance in the amount of P80,000.00 with respondent company Philippine American Life Insurance Company. Said application was approved and a corresponding policy was issued effective November 5, 1973, with petitioners as the beneficiaries. On April 26, 1975, Tan Lee Siong died of hepatoma. Hence, petitioners filed with respondent company their claim for the proceeds of the life insurance policy. However, the insurance company denied the said claim and rescinded the policy by reason of the alleged misrepresentation and concealment of material facts made by the deceased Tan Lee Siong in his application for insurance. The premiums paid on the policy were thereupon refunded. The petitioners contend that the respondent company no longer had the right to rescind the contract of insurance as rescission must allegedly be done during the lifetime of the insured within two years and prior to the commencement of action.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the insurance company has the right to rescind the contract of insurance despite the presence of an incontestability clause

 

HELD:

 

YES. The so-called “incontestability clause” precludes the insurer from raising the defenses of false representations or concealment of material facts insofar as health and previous diseases are concerned if the insurance has been in force for at least two years during the insured’s lifetime. The phrase “during the lifetime” found in Section 48 of the Insurance Law simply means that the policy is no longer considered in force after the insured has died. The key phrase in the second paragraph of Section 48 is “for a period of two years”. The policy was issued on November 6, 1973 and the insured died on April 26, 1975. The policy was thus in force for a period of only one year and five months. Considering that the insured died before the two-year period has lapsed, respondent company is not, therefore, barred from proving that the policy is void ab initio by reason of the insured’s fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation. Moreover, respondent company rescinded the contract of insurance and refunded the premiums paid on November 11, 1975, previous to the commencement of this action on November 27, 1975. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SUNLIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

SUNLIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 105135, 22 June 1995

 

FACTS:

 

Robert John Bacani procured a life insurance contract for himself from petitioner-company, designating his mother Bernarda Bacani, herein private respondent, as the beneficiary. He was issued a policy valued at P100,000.00 with double indemnity in case of accidental death. Sometime after, the insured died in a plane crash. Bernarda filed a claim with petitioner, seeking the benefits of the insurance policy taken by her son. However, said insurance company rejected the claim on the ground that the insured did not disclose material facts relevant to the issuance of the policy, thus rendering the contract of insurance voidable. Petitioner discovered that two weeks prior to his application for insurance, the insured was examined and confined at the Lung Center of the Philippines, where he was diagnosed for renal failure. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, this fact was concealed, as alleged by the petitioner. But the fact that was concealed was not the cause of death of the insured and that matters relating to the medical history of the insured is deemed to be irrelevant since petitioner waived the medical examination prior to the approval and issuance of the insurance policy.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment of such material fact, despite it not being the cause of death of the insured, is sufficient to render the insurance contract voidable

 

HELD:

 

YES. Section 26 of the Insurance Code is explicit in requiring a party to a contract of insurance to communicate to the other, in good faith, all facts within his knowledge which are material to the contract and as to which he makes no warranty, and which the other has no means of ascertaining. Anent the finding that the facts concealed had no bearing to the cause of death of the insured, it is well settled that the insured need not die of the disease he had failed to disclose to the insurer. It is sufficient that his non-disclosure misled the insurer in forming his estimates of the risks of the proposed insurance policy or in making inquiries. The SC, therefore, ruled that petitioner properly exercised its right to rescind the contract of insurance by reason of the concealment employed by the insured. It must be emphasized that rescission was exercised within the two-year contestability period as recognized in Section 48 of The Insurance Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.